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Probate Law and Practice in Connecticut. Supplement 1915-1928. By
Livingston W. Cleaveland, Harrison Hewett, Charles E. Clark & Mary
E. Manchester. New York, G. A. Jennings Co., Inc., 1929. pp. x, 445.
A brief paragraph, somewhat personal in natu.re, may perhaps be per-
missible before beginning a review of the second volume of Probate Law
and Practice. in Connecticut.
When I was admitted to the Bar in 1906 one of my first and most
constant companions was a sheep-covered volime known as Conneoticut
Probate Law, and I soon became acquainted with Judge Nobbs, the learned
and delightful person who was its author. It was my friend and advisor
through early practice. Times change, the law- develops, the world moves
on-and in 1915 the well known and ever since indispensable book by
Judge Cleaveland, Harrison Hewitt and Professor Clark was published.
This, together with my old friend, became my bible during my term as
Judge of Probate for the District of Waterbury and continued to be of
great use in later practice and on the Superior Court bench. That book
is the expression of the broad intellectual training and experience of
Judge Cleaveland in the New Haven Probate Court, the practical knowledge
of Harrison Hewitt as one of the busiest and best practicing lawyers of
this state and the keen and careful scholarship of Dean Clark. The best
description of its virtues is the one I have already given, that it has be-
come indispensable.
A new volume has now been published in order to bring it down to date.
This is, I believe, largely the work of Miss Manchester, working at the
suggestion and with the constant advice of the two surviving authors.
The book is entirely supplemental and does not in any sense supplant the
original volume. It follows the same chapter heads and section numbers
and where the law has changed or has been interpreted, indicates and
explains the change. It is perhaps an interesting comment upon our
progress in the last few years to notice that among the chapters of the
new book which contain thA most additions are those relating to fiduciaries
and trust estates. Very much new material has been added to the chapter
on the Connecticut Succession Tax. This chapter alone makes the book
a necessary and valuable addition to the tool kit of every lawyer.
The only new chapter is the last and in many respects the most im-
portant one of all. It is entitled Suggestions to Lawyers as to Drafting
Wils. It is peculiarly modern in that it is preventive. It is the result
of the experience and knowledge and real wisdom of those who have been
through the mill. Its constant use will prevent many errors and misunder-
standings and law suits. It should be carefully read by every lawyer now
and re-read every time he is preparing a will. The authors have done a
very real and a highly important service to the Bar and to all citizens
of Connecticut.
The new volume has every indication of careful and painstaking prepara-
tion and does in fact attain its purpose. It carefully and accurately
brings our Probate law and procedure down to date.
Waterbury, Conn. AuTHuR F. ELLS.
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The Now Despotsm. By The Rt. Hon. Lord Hewart of Bury. London,
Ernest Benn, 1929j pp. 308. 21s.
Walter Bagehot tells in his essays on the British constitution of a woman
-who exclaimed, "The liberties of England are at an endi" when an official
of the census of 1851t called to ask her name and age. That Ind of
woeful exaggeration often colors the zeal of the patriot. It matters not
that the problems of the state are no longer so simply defined and so
easily solved as in the days of Runnymede. Ior does the fact that the
citizen himself has in the course of several centuries succeeded to many
of the royal prerogatives alter the abiding suspicion that government of
any kind is potential tyranny. The spectre of Stuartism still stalks the
countryside and it is the duty of every true Englishman to seize upon the
slightest provocation to lay the ghost,
Thus, we find the Rlt. Hon. Lord Hewart of Bury, Lord Chief Justice
of England, startling the readers of a daily newspaper in London by a
series of sensational essays on the administrative practices of the govern-
ment, which he entitles The New Despoti . In these essays which norr
appear in a bound volume, the Lord Chief Justice reviews the rapidly
developing functions of commissions and ministries and concludes that
Anglo-Saxon democracy is in the last throes of its death agony, if, indeed,
it has not already expired. "It is," he declares, "that the whole scheme
of self-government is being undermined, and -that, too, in a way which
no self respecting people, if they were aware of the facts, would tolerate."1
The conspiracy, we are told, is to destroy the sovereignty of Parliament
and the rule of law, "the two leading features" of the British constitution,
and to enthrone a despotism differing from that of the Stuart kings only
in a greater degree of ingenuity. "The strategy is different, but the goal
is the same. It is to subordinate parliament, to evade the courts and to
render the will or caprice of the executive unfettered and supreme." 2
The first cause of this deplorable state of affairs is said to be Parliament's
surrender of wide legislative powers to the public departments. This is
found usually to have been accomplished by means of a general act in
which the intention of Parliament is vaguely outlined, while the measures
for giving the act effect are left to departmental rulings. Other cases
are cited where it is provided in so many words that departmental orders
are to have the force of parliamentary acts; and, finally, instances are
enumerated to show that in some of its delegating acts, Parliament has
given government officials authority in their own, discretion to repeal or
alter the express terms of the acts.
But Lord Hewart does not seem to believe that the mere delegation of
legislative power to these departments sounds the death knell of democracy.
He argues that constitutional integrity might still be preserved if the pres-
tigg of the courts of law had not also been seriotsly impaired. 'qt is the
abuse of the system that calls for criticism, and perhaps the greatest
abuse and the one most likely to lead to arbitrary and unreasonable legis-
lation is the ousting of the jurisdiction of the courts." a For, not only
have the departments in Thit4ehal assumed the functions of Parliament,
but in addition they have seized the authority to decide questions of a
judicial character. This is thought to be most unfortunate. The official
who makes the decision remains anonymous; he is required to give no
reasons, for his decision; he is bound by no "prlnciples"; he need permit no
oral hearing of the parties; and, since he lives continually in fear of





dismissal, it is impossible that he should ever assume the independence
demanded in an impartial arbiter. Hence, it is obvious that, possessing
none of the leavening characteristics of the procedure of the Kings Bench,
the rulings of Whitehall can never be more than the unreasoned whims of
the despot.
But that is not all. Even though all of these alleged prerequisites to
judicial action were fulfilled, it would still be impossible, according to the
author, for the civil servant in Whitehall to fill the role of judge. "Al-
though he acts in good faith and does his best to come to a right decision,
he cannot help bringing what may be called an official or departmental
mind, which is a very different thing from a judicial mind, as everyone
who has had any dealings with public officials knows, to bear on the matter
he has to decide." 4 The judicial mind, we are led to believe, is a psycholog-
ical condition peculiarly local to the neighborhood of St. Clement Dane's.
But the bureaucracy of Westminster is even more firmly entrenched. In
the good old days a precocious minister might lie hailed before the courts
under various writs and on the question of u ra vi'resa be made to rue
ambitious orders. But if the minister is given the power himself to maki
or repeal statutes, his orders carry the effect of acts of Parliament, and
he is, therefore, beyond the disciplinary influence of the King's Bench.
That such is the conspiracy seems unquestionable to the Lord Chief Justice
who finds the enabling acts of various public officials expressly declaring
that their orders shall not be subject to review by the courts.
Thus does the "new despotism," revelling in "administrative lawless-
ness," hold its "bureaucratic" sway. "The conclusion is irresistible," writes
the Lord Chief Justice, "that it is manifestly the off-spring of a well
thought out plan, the object and effect of which are to clothe the depart-
ment; with despotic powers." 5 Even the dreaded Droit Adminisratif, that
bd6e noir of Anglo-Saxon constitutionalists, were better than the existing
anarchy in England, since the undemocratic French have at least systema-
tized their despotisml
The concluding act in this tragedy of the British constitution is en-
titled "What is to be done." The answer comes quickly, albeit from the
history of long ago. The courts have always been the champions of
hberty, ide the struggles with the Tudors and the Stuarts. It remains
in the present crisis merely to induce an atavistic turn in thd processes of
government. This may be accomplished by a repeal of some of the most
flagrant statutes, and b? the cooperation of special parliamentary commit-
tees and newspaper reporters whose duty in the future will be to scrutinize
every bill that comes before the House, lest the powers of darkness find
some new scheme for seducing the unsuspecting members of Parliament.
Any serious appraisal of this astounding volume should at the outset
ignore the voluble style in which it is written. But it may nevertheless
be questioned that constant reiteration of "despotism" and cognate shib-
boleths accurately reflects the condition of administrative procedure in
England. Defects of the most glaring kind may exist, but to impute
sinister motives to the personnel of the departments because of those
defects involves a species of elliptical reasoning that is difficult to follow.
Whatever may be the outlook of the "departmental mind," it is unreasonable
to suppose that Whitehall has become a retreat for megalomaniacs.
But Ldrd Hewart is not alone in his indictment of many phases of the





bureaucracy.0 On the other hand even Dicey recognized that the growth
of administrative law in England was inevitable.7 And the view of most
students of the question is that "nothing dearly is to be regained by
repining at this evolution.' Even Professor Freund has finally to admit.
"ever since the days of parliamentary reform, however, the English dis-
like for the bureaucratic type of government has had gradually to give
-way . . . Altogether, administrative power appears as one of the eztab-
lished political facts in present day government" 0 Certainly in strking"
juxtaposition to the attitude of The New. Despotism is a statement by the
Rt. Hon. Lord Justice (now Lord Chancellor) Sankey: "It is no use
trying to defeat it (administrative law) by an appeal to the traditional
prejudice against bureaucracy. Some new method must be devised, either
by adapting old law to modern situations, or by creating a new code to
deal with them."ro It is this point of view that is adopted, in several
exhaustive studies of the problem recently published.=-
Moreover, few would support the author's contention that appeal to the
ordinary courts of law is the panacea. 2  The implication o:D his argument
would seem to be an approval of the technique of judicial review in the
United States.A3 But the doctrine of judicial review simply renders the
problem more perplexing.7 And there seems to be no reason to suppose
that the English judiciary would be more successful in dealing with "due
process" than our own courts. Finally, it is to be remembered that the
leading case of the ordinary courts of law on questions of administrative
procedure in England holds that the technique of ordinary courts of law
is not the sine qua non of administrative justice.!O
But, after all, the real question is not whether the present methodd of
the government departments run counter to the traditions of the rule
of law, or deny opportunities for judicial review. Rather, it is whether,
whatever be the methods, substantial justice is being achieved. That is
a question, the solution of which depends upon the data of actual practice.
Lord Hewarts essays are strikingly devoid of this kind of data. It is
therefore reasonable to expect that the findings of the Commission re-
cently appointed by the Lord Chancellor to investigate the operation of
administrative law will prove more valuable than the Lord Chief Justice's
theoretical analysis in effecting sound reform wherever it may be necesary.
London, England RICH= JoYcE SMITH.
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The Extraterritorfality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Sevonteenth
Centuries. By E. R. Adair. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1929.
pp. xiii, 282.
In reading this scholarly and delightful treatise one realizes with some
amazement how vary little research has been made in this most interesting
field of international law. Professor Adair has performed a most valuable
service by his historical investigations concerning early precedents, and
particularly by his analysis of the writings of international law publicists
before Grotius. His book amounts virtually to a study of diplomatic im-
munities as built up through actual cases rather than by the opinions of
publicists. His method of separating theory and practice seems a bit
artificial and is sometimes difficult to follow, but his conclusions are clear-
cut and of the highest value. The subjects thus treated are the following:
Immunity of the Ambassador from Criminal Jurisdiction; Immunity of the
Ambassador from Civil Jurisdiction; Ambassador's Immunity from Local
Jurisdiction (in miscellaneous matters); Immunity of the Ambassador's
Suite from Local Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction of Ambassadorm and Immunity
ol their Couriers and Despatches; Freedom of Worship; Inviolability of
the Ambassador's Residence; and Enforcement of an Ambassador's Im-
munities. The question of the Entertainment of Ambassadors is treated
most amusingly in a separate appendix.
Professor Adair has unearthed many picturesque incidents hidden away
in memoirs and learned texts which throw interesting light not merely on
the legal problems of exterritoriality but also on the extraordinary state
of early diplomatic relations. One is somewhat amazed to note how common
it was for ambassadors to be engaged in intrigues and conspiracies against
the very sovereigns to whom they were accredited, a practice which ex-
plains the prejudice Grotius formed respecting legationes' a.siduac. And
one is tempted furthermore to reflect on the apparent inclination of the
Russian Soviet Government to revert to such practices in its enmity to-
wards "capitalistic" governments.
In his building up of ease-made law through a study of an abundance
of precedents, Professor Adair reaches twe general conclusions of great
interest and significance. First: that diplomatic immunities wore won
through actual controversies rather than through the opinions of the
publicists. In fact, he shows conclusively that the publicists lagged on
the whole considerably behind the developments of case-made law. Grotlus,
Zouch, and Bynkershoek emerge with "flying colors," while Gentilis comes
in for rather severe criticism. The volume is of particular value by
reason of this analysis and comparison of the earlier writers on the law
of nations.
The second general conclusion is that the doctrine of exterritoriality,
in its original significance, has played a most important role in the histor-
ical development of diplomatic immunities and that it should not be dis-
carded. Professor Adair insists that the statement by Grotius ita otiam
fietione simili constituerentur quasi eztra teritorium has been distorted
and that it really implies nothing more than "such personal freedom
from the law of the state and its judicial enforcement as would be en-
joyed if the ambassador were not in the country at all." (p. 261) From the
historical point of view this is doubtless exact, but from the legal point
of view it would appear that the fiction of exterritoriality did result in
the claim that a legation was actually foreign soil, with resulting pre-
tensions which have proved embarrassing in modern practice. I doubt if
Professor Adair has given sufficient consideration to the very early prac-
tice of the foreign settlements or "factories" in the Near and in the Far
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East, where private individuals, ad well as ambassadors, were regarded as
residing within their own territorial jurisdiction. I question also whether
he has fully indicated the significance of the Franchise & quartier, which
was claimed successfully for a long period in some of these Oriental
countries. Granted that the original meaning of enterritoriality has been
grossly distorted, it would seem evident that the term has itself become
discredited, and should therefore be discarded in favor of the term "im-
munities of jurisdiction," or the term "inviolability," which seems to con-
note more exactly the personal law which diplomats, and individuals as
well, in some countries, carry with them. In other words, those who ad-
vocate the use of these latter terms are really restoring the very idea.
which Professor Adair rightfully insists was contained in the original
concept of exterritoriality. For these reasons it would seem as if Pro-
fessor Adair has been unduly severe towards, and even intolerant of, writers
such as Fauchille and Thornely, who, with logic and with the support of
abundant authorities, including Professor Adair's own teacher, Professor
Oppenhein, urge that the term ek-territoriality should be eliminated from
the terminology of international law.
I wish to express the great pleasure and profit I have found in reading
Professor Adairs splendid study of a field of international law all too.
little understood. It is an invitation to others to follow his stimulating
example.
Washington, D. C. PHILrP MARSHALL BROWV.
Ezecutive Agents in Amx*eran Foreign Relations. By Henry Merritt
Wriston. Baltimor% Johns Hopkins Press, 1929. pp. xii, 874. $5.00.
The constitutional provision requiring that the appointment of diplo-
matic representatives to act for the United States be submitted to the
Senate for its approval has been honored quite consistently in the breach.
President Wriston has surveyed comprehensively the various instances in
which the executive power, in its conduct of foreign relations, has beem
able to move outside the constitutional trammel. He has produced a care-
fully documented study, in which he describes and analyzes with shill the
long struggle between the President and the Senate. Victory has almost
invariably been on the side of the executive. In the case of diplomatic
representatives resident in foreign capitals confirmation by the Senate
has been sought and secured. In a host of cases of diplomatic appoint-
ments by the President, however, the constitutional provision has been
evaded and the intent of the framers of the Constitution disregarded.
Rather less than half of this book is devoted to the origin of the prac-
tice of appointing executive agents and to an analysis of the constitutional
problems involved. President Wriston explains the constitutional back-
ground, discusses the appointing power, the criteria of office, of rank, and
title, and devotes a hundred pages to a record of congressional opinion
concerning the use of executive agents, opinion almost invariably determ-
ined by political expediency. The second and larger part of the book
is given over to a study of the types of. special agents utilized by the execu-
tive, which axe classified generally according to the circumstances and.
motives that induced the President to appoint them. They include agents
sent to open relations with foreign countries, agents to countries with
which the United States had broken off relations, agents to unrecognized.
states and governments, agents to colonial and dependent governments,
agents to international conferences, agents to countries where the United.
States had no regular diplomatic officers. Finally, there is the long list
of special agents utilized for miscellaneous purposes, of whom a small
19301 767
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number chiefly in the early days of the republic might be termed "secret
agents." Others have been expert and technical agents, ceremonial agents,
and agents sent to assist and advise the regular representatives. Colonel
House is listed in this latter category. He is regarded by President Wris-
ton as "by a -wide margin the most important executive agent in our his-
tory," but the long record of the activities and functions presented in the
book shows a precedent for almost every undertaking carried on by
Colonel House, although il me case were so many varieties of service com-
bined in a single person. The practice of utiliziig the executive agent
stands now apparently buttressed safely by precedent and generally ac-
cepted as sound. As President Wriston concludes, its history contributes
"an interesting illustration of the adaptability of American constitutional
practice, to meet the changing situations of a growing nation."
New Haven, Conh. CHARLES SEYMOUR.
Outlines of Real Property. By Herbert Thorndike Tiffany. Chicago,
Callaghan & Co., 1929. pp. xcvi, '704.
This work is a combination of portions of the text of the second edition
of Tiffany on Real Property plus adaptations of the black lette heads
of the first edition. Apparently the only new material is a section on
Community Property by Mr. Brune. The purpose of the -vork is to servo
ag a textbook for beginners and in this respect it will have an advantage
in brevity over the other books. It is by no means a new contribution
to the law.
Iowa City, Iowa PERCY BORDWELL.
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